

BĀLAVAT

**THE
SUPERPLAN**

Preface by Prof. Dr. Harald Seubert*

I.

To the philosopher with an interest in the East, yet being grounded in the tradition of Western Europe, especially the tradition of mysticism, this book is both provocation and fascination at once, or better said: *tremendum* and *fascinans* in absolute clarity! Bālavat's treatise is like a piece of ancient writing, a message in a bottle or else an ancient epic, washed up to our far way shores – and challenging our understanding. At the same time, this treatise is supremely topical. It would be an error to respond to it by tracking down philological traces and affinities, especially if it were only to state that there was nothing new under the speculative sun. Equally and at the same time, one must not remain silent in the face of the alterity of this approach. Its deep coherence lies in itself, but also in transformation: the phoenix-like renewal of manifold traditions. Bālavat's point of view makes things look not unlike the messianic state described by the Jewish Kabbala: it is not a new world that emerges, but the old world in an altogether different light in which paradise's glow, shining back from the past, and the glow of being redeemed, shining forth from the future, unite – in constant transformation, figuration and transfiguration.

The following is a first – and therefore necessarily deficient – attempt of a response.

Bālavat writes with the crystalline and powerful pen of a visual artist. Thinking in words is always just preliminary with him. Precisely therein, however, lies its paramount importance. This kind of thinking requires its realization

in images which are never just copies, but are bound to become archetypes. Meister Eckhart observed in this context that an image was lifted out of nature and changed into nonbeing, as it did not thereby draw attention to itself but to that which appeared in it. The image, therefore, is so to speak generic for the being nothingness. Nevertheless the mental work at hand is of high rank and aspiration: joining what is incompatible, touching heaven with its peaks, yet staying grounded in the soil: this is precisely the object of juxtapositional thinking in identity as Bālavat develops this. It allows him to touch the very heart of the fundamental questions of being and existence, from which contemporary academic philosophy shies away in its scholasticism of words. Psychoanalyst Erich Neumann had good reasons to conclude that the dangers and bitter realities of our world and the formal vacuity of formal ethics were interrelated in almost obscene disproportionality.

The pursuit of personal ambitions in cultural criticism are not even a prerequisite in order to perceive the whole fragility underneath the shimmering surface of a shining world determined throughout by economic considerations: the imbecility of the last humans reducing the utilitarian system to absurdity and making politics obsolete. The latter has been replaced by a straightforward distribution mechanism. The happiness of the largest possible number of people moves within the narrow confines set by the expectations and role models acceptable to the free market. The creature of utility declares itself good and its world as the best possible world, yet beneath this surface lurks the unfathomable grimace of self-destruction, of annihilation through boredom and self-hatred. The spiritual dimension of the world is fading. ONE WORLD arises which lacks the single aspect one had always

expected of the world's unification: peace. Kant based this expectation of peace on the idea of exchange (commercium) among different people. That is the same difference Aristotle saw in the "politiké koinonia". In the abstract theoretical models of the One World, this difference tends to be eliminated. However, just beneath the threshold of perception it lies in wait and threatens to pounce. Academic science and the highly remunerated market niches for popular art both hardly escape the odium of irrelevance. The political indicators from the right and from the left turn out to be equally vapid. Oswald Spengler's almost forgotten diagnosis proves to be true: a millennia-old culture perishes in civilization* and thus becomes an object for insipid cultural analysts and theorists to marvel at it and to archive it.

Weak thinking rejects every question considering the good life – which necessarily will be confronted with the wall of common sense – with a cynicism that does not even have to try to prove to have known everything already. The expansive vision Bālavat presents here is therefore all the more remarkable, all the more so in that it begins at the highest point, in the middle, precisely with Being Nothingness.

To ascertain that the democratic masses of the greatest possible happiness for the largest possible number of people have become "fellahs", as Max Weber determined this, does not mean to despise man. Rather, it means observing one's own entrapment in the very same process – and in a time in which man is dismissed in many respects this can only imply the transcendence of Superman.

What has been seems to have turned gray and ashy in the "brave new world", just like the bird phoenix; a thinker like Bālavat melts this past down to let it re-emerge in new life. This is also a philosophical event.

II.

Bālavats thinking is strictly arranged according to the logic of causality. Beginning with the Being Nothingness as the world's center and focal point, a conception of being evolves that breaks through conventional limitations. Mathematic-geometrical illustrations and physical theories (theory of relativity) are part of the new vision of being as a whole. Similarly Nicolaus Cusanus had exposed the coincidence of minimum and maximum on the basis of the geometry of a stalk's angle and kink. Of course this happened before Kant. The juxtapositional thinking in identity can not concur with that limitation of causal thinking to time and space as forms of sensible intuition and the boundaries drawn by theoretical reason. That kind of thinking thereby disregards the limitations of the scientific point of view – and one might think of the young Walter Benjamin explaining to his friend Gershom Scholem that experience is not only just sense perception, but must reach right down to the abysses of the mystical and the frenzy-like ecstatic.

For Bālavat states from the start that time exists “on an infinite, non-temporal basis”. Or: “Time and infinity are one. Non-timeliness and infinity are one” (p. 39). In this sense he can also state that standstill and movement are just two sides of the same coin. In his: ‘Beiträge zur Philosophie. Vom Ereignis’ from his posthumous writing, Heidegger had brought time and space into a state of inner mutual dependence (Gegenwendigkeit). He speaks about time-space swaying in itself, explaining: “Space is rendering ab-ground that charms-moves unto the encircling hold. Time is rendering ab-ground that removes unto the gathering.” – therein time-space appears as ab-ground. Juxtapositional, from the inapparent middle of the Being Nothingness, this thought, Heidegger anticipated, could be added a

downright compelling clarity. Similarly a transformed version of Whitehead's intention of a space-time continuum can also be found in the work of Bālavat. The ontological outline of Bālavat's work is, fundamentally constituted, triadic: by involution, by compression, The Being Nothingness becomes its own opposite – primary matter. Thereby plurality emanates from the oneness of the Being Nothingness which is a fundamental act sufficiently lit up by joy and overabundance for the creative spirit that bears its homelessness. Evolution then is the return to the oneness of the cause of emergence, its spiritualization and sublimation, which certainly has to pass through the withering away and the depression of this old matter and which peaks in a transformation of the same. This is a more probably intuitive but nonetheless ingenious answer to a constellation that appears in Plato's late dialogue, 'Timaeus'. In Plato's work, primary matter is called the CHORA (the "mother and foster of becoming"), which contains the elements in a disorganized, fluid form after the beginning from reason (the first beginning) – whereas the second beginning form necessity (*ex anankes*) leads back to the pre-elementary first beginning. How do the highest idea and the CHORA, of which to speak is only possible by using allegories and metaphors – as Plato shows us – relate? This question has yet to be posed by ancient commentators of Plato. It has been noted again and again that both the highest idea and CHORA are in diametrical opposition to each other yet still closely adjacent at the same time. This is just the closest proximity possible of good and evil, which was brought to light by the neoplatonic reinterpretation of CHORA as '*autokakon*' (as evil itself). However, this proximity was invalidated almost in the same breath by conceptualizing evil as '*Privatio boni*'. Bālavat

understands matter exactly in terms of the platonic CHORA as “substance of infinite transcendental possibilities”: as unlimited paragon of that which CAN be. This stands in subtle association with Nicolaus Cusanus comprehending ability (POSSE) as the final – and valid – concept of the Absolute, at least as the one he tried to conceptualize till his death. This is to be understood as an abbreviation of the involution-evolution process, since that very concept had been described by the compound POSS-EST in an earlier version.

In one single, cataract-like sentence, this prehistory is invoked, incidentally quite similar to Schelling’s great proto-narrative of the aeons’ genesis from the ur-past. “Within an infinite, steady, spatial-temporal extent and a simultaneous spatial extent, caused by a permanent involution of the BEING NOTHINGNESS changing to its own opposite for reasons of objectification, plus a primary matter, having become morbid from that involution of consciousness, and which, being weakened in being sensible for the fundamental ONENESS, rather collapses due to continuing decomposition and dissection, than explodes within the Big Bang, [...] every geometrical point indicates the middle of the whole infinite space-time-matter extent, at the latest from that moment on in which that extent becomes boundless, for every point is equidistantly, i.e. indefinable, accordingly equally infinitely apart from the extent’s boundaries” (p. 80).

From this central point, evolution turns out to be rather not the one and only mode of genesis, but the return of the Being Nothingness from primary matter to itself. Bālavat’s world philosophy integrates the evolutionary thought as well as the “Big Bang”, which however is not anything like the initial genesis but the collapse of the matter’s supreme inner tension.

Talking about evolution and the Big Bang remains of – admittedly confined – justification. Their key however opens only for a restricted perspective. Just as the number of basic dualities, as Bālavat knows, is unlimited since they all emerge from the absolute ONENESS. Thus juxtapositionary thinking does not know of inner intermediation, as Hegelian (and Marxian) real-dialectics would have it. Intermediation lies beyond the engine of dialectics, beyond the diathesis of being and nothingness. For the crucial question concerning the heart of the term of transcendence, as Bālavat notes, does not orbit “to be or not to be” in the old Hamlet-sense anymore, “since, due to its existence, nonbeing evolves into the substance of the not-appearing being itself” (p. 272). This thought too is obviously quite close to Heidegger, whose view of the nothingness of all entities, was made up towards and deepened on being. At the beginning of Hegelian logics, however, stand the non-mediated supreme antinomy of being and nothingness – they are absolutely separated, yet still they are likewise the same due to the immediacy of their transition, which can not be put in terms. Hegel, being the explicit thinker of intermediation he was, might not have ever left this non-mediatedness completely behind.

III.

Juxtapositional thinking wholeheartedly commits to the highest point of cognition – and from there it sees how “any seeming dichotomy” finds its place within an infinitely developing evolutionary whole. Starting from here Bālavat makes the distance to Hegel especially clear: Hegel’s speculative dialectics could only retain “the last knowledge, the absolute spirit of an universal deity” – anything else would break away. Bālavat is closer to the thinking of Nicolaus Cusanus, of whom there is no talk of in Bālavat’s writing. He is closer to the

'*apex theoriae*' (the peak of contemplation), the crystal clear truth of the alley, thinking the one over-different reason that is simply undeniable. Moreover juxtapositional thinking differs at any rate from Hegel's speculative logic by always being specific, always being related to a situation in the here and now. In modernity too there can be found a resonance in Whitehead's 'Process and Reality' – a tremendous cosmological conception of the world as process. Yet Whitehead thinks as an empiric, he thinks from the particular fact as realization of the world in one exemplar. This is different with Bālavat's work in which this restriction drops out as he disengages from the fixation on the individual. To Bālavat, every entity is one and all. "At this point the highest knowledge becomes the understanding power of the mind in dealing with present entities, *videlicet* not in the sense of a theoretical aloofness but *in situ*". But even in this dissociation it becomes quite clear what sets the benchmark: not less than an identity and identity and non-identity, and with that an ultimate point for which all speculative thinking was looking, the Hegelian thinking as well.

The term causal logic should not be taken as self-evident all too much in Bālavat's work. For causality, as it is of special significance for his thinking in the first part of the book, does not mean causality in the sense of a linear coherence of cause and effect. Within the concept of causality according to Bālavat, the whole range of the classical four *causae* resonates (*causa materialis, causa formalis, causa finalis, causa efficiens*), which was extensively reduced to *causa efficiens* in modern times. And this range only makes sense in the entirety of the universe and its one center, the being nothingness. Thus it is always a multidimensional range, a mellow chord in which the two termini (*eschata*) of the ONE and the

overarching KOINON meet: "just as the conscious, supremely subjective BEING NOTHINGNESS is the total and the individual all at once, [and] can spontaneously be recognized and experienced" (p. 138). Cause and reason, being divided along the way of western metaphysics, prove to be inseparable here. This is exactly the point where the complementary thinking in words transitions into the pictorially experiencable object consciousness. In the same way, logos in the Bālavatian sense means the establishedness and the orderliness of the KOSMOS itself, as it once did for Heraclitus. In the first part, the fabric of this causation is addressed in a big unfolding of reason* itself. To Kant this would be an ABYSSUS, an abyss of reason itself. Still world reason must ask further. Whereas Cusanus once dared to write a text in which reason voices the outrageous itself: 'I am'.

In the second part the radiations of this ONE reason* get continuously mediated and pitted against cliffs of western-eastern thinking. Just one triple feature shall be highlighted here:

1. The being nothingness is likewise trans-objective and trans-subjective. This does not mean, however, that the difference between subject and object is being circumvented from the start, as it is the case in Heidegger's thought of 'always already being situated in a world'. It rather means at the same time: "The BEING NOTHINGNESS - or better still its appearance-lacking substance - is, for it is BEING, not only supremely subjective, but also supremely objective" (p. 285) - which according to juxtapositional thinking in identity is also valid vice versa. So the BEING NOTHINGNESS leads to a self-consciousness that cannot be reflexive, that cannot be led by the question "whether I am", but rather

appears in the certainty 'that I am there, even if I did not want to' (p.279).

2. Yet this immemoriality of self-being cannot be boxed in the perimeter of the I. The personification of the apersonal highest subject (p. 389) is rather crucial instead: a thought quite close to the Johannine proposition of the LOGOS' incarnation.

This personification, which keeps its apersonality at the same time, is spirit - and thus it could be seen as an answer to Nietzsche's precept of 'perceive cosmically!'. God's individualization has to be left behind - at this point Bālavat is clearly beyond the scope of Christian belief and any belief in an individual deity. God's throne is empty, as Bālavat repeatedly emphasized. The death of God is quasi a first molting, erupting from the duality and leading to this insight. That implies a fascinating figure of thought which is not at all apprehended by conventional epithets such as pantheism, as it retains via juxtaposition the identity of being and nothingness. "God is therefore every form or he has no PERSONALITY. But if every form is God, God is every form, too, i.e.: the highest subject of non-apparent omnipotent substance fills every objective form - even ours - since the BEING NOTHINGNESS is indivisible due to its non-appearance" (p. 392). This again means nothing less than that each individual is the ONE, "we just do not know it. And with our mask taken from us, we are the NOTHINGNESS, the BEING, utmost subjective omnipotent" (p. 392). This identity in the difference to the Being Nothingness is Bālavat's concept of mind which could take up and solve questions that remain dissonant even in the works of a thinker of Heidegger's rank - as is the case for instance when Heidegger occasionally says that being needs and enforces man and then again on the contrary deals with being beyond man.

3. The interrelation between the eternal, the infinite, and finitude is conceived not less distinctly: the Being Nothingness' potentiality itself is non-appearance. The point and nudge comprising everything, as Angelus Silesius called it. Infinity, the Greek's APEIRON emerging from unending division and thus must lead to auto-exhaustion and tedious destruction. The Greeks feared this APEIRON: the unsurveyed, vast land areas and the even more threatening sea. It shall not be underrated that it was not until the infinitesimal calculus that infinity could be conceivable and comprehensible. Yet finitude first and foremost appears with the evolutionary reduction of the Apeiron, the primary matter. Therefore Bālavat can say that finitude is: "basically just another aggregate state of the non-appearing eternal" (p. 329). Regarding this finitude however, the individual can make sense of itself and its affinity to the Being Nothingness, to this individual past and future events are the same.

IV.

Bālavat weaves a west-eastern divan. Therefore inquiring after the western thinkers playing a role for him is not at all irrelevant: repeatedly Plato, with regards to the fusion of the Good and the Eros - and especially of superabundance. Sharp-eyed he recognizes Dionysiac genius in Plato's thought. Plotinus too, thinker of the One - and its emanation - is of vital importance. Sparsely mentioned, yet always kept in mind is of course Nietzsche. Eastern paths of thought culminate in Sri Aurobindo's grand treatise on 'The Life Divine': particularly at its climax - the supramental. In the first part of the work the vision of the Being Nothingness unfolds in a crystal clear diction: for vision it is: not a mere thought, an idea comprising its own

materialization. It is not only a few adepts that are being addressed with that vision remaining arcane even to them. No: one can follow Bālavat's thoughts, steadily bringing them to further self- and world-transforming clarity on one's own. In such contexts Goethe spoke of EPIRRHEMA, the obvious secret. And also Cusanus and his utterance that truth screams in the alley should be thought of once more.

Being Nothingness is being described with epithets with which Mysticism and also Apophatic theology are familiar. Augustine termed the basic form of the latter: "If you understand it, it is not God". Therefore Being Nothingness is: space- and timeless, neither subject to a beginning nor to an end. It is - platonically ARRHETON -, even if we give it names it remains unnamable (p. 61). The Greeks distinguished between 'ouk on' and 'me on': indicating sheer nothingness: *ouk on* being a *Nihil negativum*, would not even be conceivable. Bālavat also states that it is simply not conceivable. Sheer nothingness were only knowable if nothingness had come into the picture. The fascinating initial idea is that Being Nothingness is the endmost point we could ever reach down to and which proves to be the beginning of and reason for appearance; it is precisely because of the absence of any appearance that its presence is 'existence' as such due to absence of any appearance of existence.

Nietzsche is of particular importance in the sense of being a matrix. By turning away from his former mentor Schopenhauer, Nietzsche had found his insight into the tragic depths - the abyss - of Dasein. Unlike Schopenhauer's adoption of Far Eastern thought in terms of overcoming the *Principium individuationis* of space and time by the Quietiv of defeatism, Nietzsche sought for the affirmation of recurring life even in its pain

and its experience of its own nullity. This is the crux of the thought of eternal recurrence, of calling for an encore while catching sight of one's own nullity and squandering. From here on Nietzsche repeatedly indicated the outline of a 'European Buddhism' that precisely does not deny the determination for nullity as the 'Passages to India' did in the 19th century. It occurs to me that the west-eastern divan Bālavat weaves makes exactly this Nietzschean dream come true. Even more: he congenially combines Nietzsche's grand thoughts without them being mentioned explicitly: eternal recurrence beyond the spirit of vengeance, hence: Amor fati, the self-appropriation of that recurrence within the overman and the will to power. Tracing back to Nietzsche from Bālavat's standpoint, it becomes clear that Nietzsche is neither the ideologist as former times would have it, nor the destroyer of signs but a thinker of the world. Being transformed by Bālavat, an artist transforms the thought of Nietzsche, who was longing for the vivid power but who remained within the European movement of doubt and questioning: "wretched braindog, laden down with god" as Gottfried Benn put it in his poem "Subway Train".

The name Bālavat refers to the state of the playing child Nietzsche was longing for. Even Heraclitus already acknowledged it as PAIS PAIZON: and it is this child, being given to the pure joy of the innocence of becoming, that plays a cosmic world game, yet who destroys at the same time. Both these aspects are detectable in Bālavat's work.

V.

Thinking difference (and the non-concealing but at the same time overarching identity) will have to be evaluated in regard to up to what extent it includes evil, suffering

and pain: the sting of any philosophy according to Schiller. That is exactly what Bālavat's thinking *consists* in: he does not take pain, negation to be illusions. It would break open as the inversion of the rapture, the joy inspiring involution, into its own opposite. The hell of depression, of boredom, of gloom might be especially aggravating; these being basic states within which world fades into the background and, as Heidegger described it like no other, within which being itself gapes open as nothingness. Bālavat remarks: "Suffering and pain are the inevitable price the being conceiving itself as limited has to pay for brining the material form into the being and consciousness, eternal and delighted with itself, of the Being Nothingness" (p. 137). Exactly at this point his ingenious solution of the problem of theodicy starts: There is no justification for a certain loss, a certain destruction within the superplan of the Being Nothingness. So this solution presupposes an exercise in detaching from the modes of existence, the loss of which is being mourned for - and in becoming ONE with the Being Nothingness. It takes pain and its Calvaries to be a price that could not be paid with etherealization and spiritualization but with preserving the traces of body, the unity of body and mind.

It is only at a first glance that it seems disconcerting to have the food chain following the harsh topos of theodicy as a second naming of resistance and pain. Within unity-allness it should be changed into a sublimity of gift, of self-giving.

VI.

How may this thinking of the world be articulated? The two parts of the book are borne by different dictions each: the first part is like a crystal, sure enough as a form of solidification evolving vitally and defining like frozen water, fire standing still. Bālavat's sentences can

be apodictically short: still images. And they can overflow into cascades and fast flows, hypotactically delaying the ending of a sentence, recapitulating the precise definitions once more in a synoptic view. Nevertheless it initially seems like a congenial counterdraft of Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus' or Spinoza's 'Ethica' written by a visual artist. In contrast the second part unwinds variations like in a free dance, like a movement raving into distantness. It likewise offers meditations allowing an opportunity to follow up the basic vision. At this point even more clearly it is the artist speaking, who stretched the term to its limits. Within term-less thinking the thinker becomes one with his subject: that is the point being called THEOREIA in antiquity and at which conceiving is not proceeding discursively anymore - bit by bit - but at which the different is beheld. It proves to be actually divine. But according to Bālavat it is exactly at this point that incubation (p. 220) begins in the first place. The weary thinking rests, runs dry as in a Godnight, and waits to receive and to internalize the inexpressible. This is the place of self-acting imagination what Bālavat creates his artistic work from. A state of utmost dia- and theophany, of utmost consciousness and imagination at the same time, within which the artwork becomes, totally corresponding Nietzsche, life-work and thereby practical. In the course of this one finds biting Nietzschean tones, a new gospel. This connects to the state of trans-justice within which the play of market and exploitation were just a higher joke.

What Bālavat notes in serenity becomes especially overt in modernity: ethics and morality are secondary forces. As soon as distress and scarcity come forward, as soon as the cultural varnish gets thinner, evolution also emerges in its nudity and destruction. The Freudian death instinct and 'Civilization and Its Discontents' prove to be undeniable reality. Establishing this reveals the

REVOLUTIO of consciousness as a distress-resorting leap.

Grand eminent thinking has sought for that: what else would Hölderlin's or Schelling's impulse since their early resonances on the merely superficial French Revolution have been - in the background of this looms the reverberation room of Meister Eckhart's mysticism -, but also Nietzsche's frenzy in Naumburg, and, probably closest to Bālavat's question: Heidegger's ALETHEIA, the disclosure of the hidden, which is nothing less but being that is nothing to all beings: Being Nothingness. One shall not forget others, 'extreme outsiders' who were not being brushed aside by time, even if they apparently broke under it - such as the notional life-ecologist Rudolf Bahro.

Objections and questions are not to be concealed. These concern the residual remains of a dualism. Bālavat repeatedly emphasizes that his essay had nothing in common with religion or mysticism. This might be so in a conventional sense. But isn't religion a movement of transcendence towards the unification with the One (*homoiosis tou theou*: as Platonism says) at its core, and does not the Christian divine childhood add 'corporeal glorification', the incarnation of LOGOS to the sublimating immortality of the soul? It appears to me that only an abstract understanding of religion, clinging to dualisms itself, comes into question for being such an antidote to art and exercise, as Sloterdijk seems to suggest. True, this deep dimension brings thinking-vision-philosophy-religion and art into a very close synopsis. Should this not be another touchstone, indeed: a genuine field of juxtapositional thinking? Manifold comparable evidence for that oneness, which transcends the mental in the focus of the Being Nothingness, could be found in mystical speculative thinking, which seeks

for the utmost supramental state itself within which vision and the seeing become one - as is the case in Cusanus' Visio absoluta - : Meister Eckhart in his sermon 48: "Now pay good heed to me! If it happens that my eye is in itself one and simple, and it is opened and casts its glance upon the piece of wood, the eye and the wood remain what they are, and yet in the act of vision they become as one, so that we can truly say that my eye is the wood and the wood is my eye."

Bālavat also brings up the question of the destruction of memory, cultures and worlds of thought. Are we actually, and as it seems to be, superficially reared, in the late phase of a 'civilization' that can find no vivid strength, that cannot forget and therefore dies away into an euthanasia-decadence from which barbarism can erupt abruptly? Crucial in this context is again Bālavat's concept of embodiment that preserves the fiery nucleus of the past but at the same time will bring it into a totally new constellation. The old phoenix will be preserved only in its dying away and in its fierily re-creation which returns him his body at the same time.

"So we, the absolute outsiders of the expired, unfortunately only 'just' democratic society, this worthless end-of-range model of 'unjust' capitalistic trimming of inhuman, exploitative and robbing action, would finally once have the big headlines, which we do not deserve rightfully but compensatory: The stupid and powerless, impotently wallowing in themselves, not being capable of mind-terror ignorant are dead! Down with all receptive dualists! Burn them this very day! Throw them into the sea! Too precious a stone for them! Long live the overdimension of TRANSJUSTICE! Hallelujah!" (p. 404)

The revolution of consciousness itself is however beyond this apocalyptic in the work of Bālavat. It is of great clarity of sense, like an autumn day, an atmosphere as Nietzsche saw it in Goethe's novella, azure sea. It detects how love, Eros, Thanatos are being absorbed in diremption - named for terms of diremption such as 'sexual drive' from psychoanalysis and 'mechanism of reproduction' from neurophysiology. The juxtapositional form of life and thought withdraws the existence of both, so that "the sexual act consists of insight and reflective act and brings about 'ecstasy' as the steady state of existential joy of and within the coalescence of all contrasts of evolutionary becoming and conscious being" (p. 415). This thinking is not utopian since it begins with the here and now! Even more: it IS, forasmuch it declares itself, in between of art, vision and philosophical articulation.

Bālavat succeeds in that which had been denied to Nietzsche, the Ancient-European, whose Janus-Sight never gained salvation, by conceptualizing it as a grand and serious game. To put it loosely in Nietzsche's terms: this thinking has already emancipated from emancipation. That is exactly why it can cope without the watchdog-tone of the life reformers, precisely for it already left the step of revolution behind.

At the end Bālavat states that comprehending the insight, the SUPERPLAN gives an account for, i.e. the advancement to the para-person, had been liberating as well as disillusioning at first. One hears a kind of 'golden laughter' here, a self-apotheosis of the truly free and likewise grand spirit, and one steps out into the open. Within the initial thought Bālavat wonderfully notes what is to be realized starting from this point: "that cognition generates truth, then truth generates beauty, finally beauty generates perfection and all together generate

the real good" - the placeless (a-topical) place for the free, ever homeless creative spirit.

* I would like to thank my friend Andreas Mascha for confiding in me and asking me for a first feedback and a preface to this extraordinary work. I am very aware of the insufficiency and approaching of the attempt. One should go on meditating for a long, very long time, before being able to mirror the flow of the SUPERPLAN in one's own thought. But does juxtapositional thinking not also mean that the beginning is the whole? The way there and the way back are the same: well-rounded (kykleos) is the truth as Parmenides teaches us.

Prof. Dr. Harald Seubert, April 2010